The article discusses the identification and valuation of private benefits of control occurring when the State Treasury retains controlling interest in a company that is being privatized. The benefits are gained by politicians at the expense of the State Treasury and private investors.
Introduction
Private benefits of control of company resources are one of the key issues dealt with by today's corporate-finance researchers, which is reflected in the subject literature. In particular, publications devoted to investor protection and its significance for financial market development lay special emphasis on the value of private benefits gained by the party in control of the company.
The most up-to-date research in this field suggests that private benefits of control account for 14% of the equity value 1 . However, the research concerns private companies. Relatively little of the subject literature is devoted to private benefits which can be gained if one owns shares in state-owned companies. The problem gains special significance in an economy undergoing transformation and finds its expression in the State Treasury's retention of shares in companies which are being privatized. Apart from private investors, it is also politicians who can gain benefits of control.
Difficulties with the identification and measurement of the value of private benefits of control gained by politicians result from the nature of the phenomenon. So far, a complete catalogue of manifestations of private benefits of control has not been made. Financing election campaigns and buying people's votes are the most common forms of benefit derived by politicians. In the case of companies with the State Treasury's majority shareholding, these benefits are enjoyed at the expense of both the State Treasury and private investors. An example of minority shareholders expropriation is the case of Eureko B.V., which has shares in PZU, Poland's largest insurance company.
Using the example of Eureko B.V.'s investment in PZU, we demonstrate that the subject of the conflict between majority and minority shareholders can be reduced to the issue of ownership structure selection.
The article is divided into four sections. The first one presents the idea of private benefits of control. The second section is devoted to the discussion of manifestations and consequences of politicians' control of companies. In the third section we point to the possibility of treating the control of a company as the right to choose the ownership structure.
Finally, we suggest applying the option approach to estimating the value of the right to choose the ownership structure.
The idea of private benefits of control
In the subject literature, the idea of private benefits of control is very often understood as the "psychological" value which shareholders attribute to the possession of power " 1976, Vol. 3, pp. 305-360 Exploiting company resources in order to obtain perquisites is a much more measurable way of gaining private benefits of control than running one's company "in one's own way".
This does not mean, however, that it is the most significant way. Expropriation of minority shareholders by the party in control of the company can be carried out on a considerably larger scale and in a considerably more refined way 4 . According to Johnson, La-Porta, Lopezde-Silanes and Schleifer, we can distinguish two basic forms of tunneling. The first one consists in transferring company resources by means of self-dealing. This type of transaction covers both activities which are illegal by definition, such as theft or fraud, and activities which are ostensibly legal. The latter include the purchase or sale of products and assets at prices different from market prices, higher than "fair" transfer price, managers' remuneration, loan repayment guarantees or taking over the company's investment opportunities for one's own purposes. Another method of tunneling is transactions leading to dilution. The party in control increases its share through dilutive share issues, minority freeze-outs, insider trading, creeping acquisitions or other financial transactions which result in discrimination against minority shareholders.
The psychological aspect of private benefits of control is much more difficult to define, and thus to quantify. An example of such benefits, given by Demsetz and Lehn, is amenities enjoyed by sports club and media owners in the form of the ability to influence competition results or the public opinion 5 . Other authors point to social prestige, family traditions, the opportunity to promote one's relatives, i.e. issues connected with reputation broadly understood 6 .
Taking into account all these considerations, it should be stated that private benefits of control can concern any situation in which a value, irrespective of its origin, is not shared among shareholders proportionally to the shares owned, but its only beneficiary is the party in control 7 . At the same time, it should be noted that private benefits of control can take the form of pecuniary or non-pecuniary benefits. Differences among private benefits of control can concern the degree of their transferability. The basic kinds of private benefits of control are listed in Table 1 The nature of private benefits of control makes it difficult, or even impossible, to measure them. This is reflected in the methods used in practice to measure private benefits of control.
Two such methods can be found in the literature.
The first one has been put forward by Barclay and Holderness 8 . Its starting point is the assumption that the share price paid by the purchaser of controlling interest corresponds with the sum of the benefits he obtains in the form of a certain part of the cash flow generated by the company and private benefits of control. The first kind of benefits results from the possession of an adequate number of company shares, the other -from one's position.
However, the market price of shares after control has been gained corresponds with a minority shareholder's share in the cash flow generated by the company when run by the new managers. The difference between the share price in a transaction leading to the acquisition of controlling interest and the market price quoted after the sale of a shareholding is announced determines the value of private benefits of control.
The second method of estimating the value of private benefits of control is based on the distinction between shares according to the number of voting rights. Rydquist, Zingales and Nenova argue that the value of private benefits of control corresponds with the difference between the prices of shares with different voting rights 9 .
It is pointed out in the literature that the two methods presented above are by no means perfect. Estimations of the value of private benefits of control made with the use of these methods do not take into account non-pecuniary benefits of control 10 .
It should be emphasized that private benefits of control are by their nature difficult to identify and quantify. Otherwise, the possibility that minority shareholders will take legal action to assert their rights would mean these benefits might lose their private character. It is worth noting that -apart from private investors -it is also politicians that can derive private benefits of control of the company.
Manifestations and consequences of politicians' control of companies
The problem of politicians' control of companies becomes especially significant in the case of the privatization of state enterprises. According to Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, there is a conflict of interests between managers and politicians. Because of potential political benefits, politicians allow companies to be overstaffed and to pay high wages. On the other hand, managers predicting the acquisition of some shares are interested in improving the company's effectiveness. Both sides of the conflict play a game of sorts over the size and costs of employment.
The authors illustrate the issue of politicians' control of companies with a model according to which the company determines labour spending (E). It is also assumed that managers represent the interests of private shareholders. The participation of private owners in the company's profits amounts to , whereas the State Treasury's participation is (1 -).
The interest of politicians who do not have shares comes down to receiving the employees' support in elections. To achieve this, they exert pressure on the company to increase labour spending. Politicians' marginal benefit of an extra dollar designed for remuneration equals q (q < 1). Increased labour spending results in the company's lower profits. The possible occurrence of potential losses causes politicians to take into account the State Treasury's sanctions. The cost a politician pays because of the State Treasury's loss of a profit of the firm amounts to m. Since the politician cares more about his own income than the State Treasury's revenue, the values of m are less than 1. The compromise between the benefits and costs associated with excessively increased labour spending is expressed by the politician objective
The manager (shareholder) objective function reflects only benefits from participation in the company's profits.
A key role in the model is played by the entity in control of labour spending. In the case of companies with a dominant shareholding owned by the State Treasury, labour spending is determined by politicians. Politicians' propensity to increase remuneration is expressed by the following condition:
It follows from condition (3) that politicians' benefits per dollar of extra spending on labour are higher than the costs which the politicians suffer when the State Treasury consequently loses a revenue unit. Politicians' control of companies gives rise to a lower effectiveness of the economy, which benefits politicians at the expense of the State Treasury and the other shareholders. sale of a company are the highest when control rights and cash-flow rights are sold separately.
The optimum method of selling cash-flow rights is an initial public offering (IPO), while the best way of selling control rights is a direct transaction with a purchaser 16 .
As a result of the change in the PZU privatization strategy, the State Treasury still owns a majority stake in the company's equity. It is the State Treasury's right, therefore, to appoint the majority of managers in the company. However, such appointments are as a rule based on political considerations, whose aim is neither improvement in the work of PZU nor proper management of the company's activity. As each political party appoints its representatives, since 1999 PZU has had as many as seven chairmen of the board appointed by the State
Treasury.
At present, Eureko demands to be sold the promised 21% of PZU shares at 2001 prices and to be paid compensation, the level of which is estimated at approximately 1,500 million euros. A question arises, therefore, concerning the grounds for and the level of compensation.
In the next part of the paper we are attempting to present the theoretical justification for the claim. We reduce the issue of possessing control of a company to the possession of the right to choose its ownership structure.
The right to choose the ownership structure as an instance of private benefits of control
A private company and a public company are two basic forms of corporate ownership structure. The choice of an ownership structure is a compromise between certain benefits and costs 17 . The benefits of operating as a public company constitute the costs of conducting business as a private company, and vice versa.
The issue of selecting the corporate ownership structure is widely discussed in the literature. The most significant benefits of operating as a public company include: benefits from risk diversification, liquidity of shares, or manager monitoring. The model discusses the case of an entrepreneur who considers the possibility of initial public offering. It is assumed that it is possible to reverse an earlier decision at any time. In order to focus exclusively on ownership structure selection, the model ignores the problem of investment diversification. The criterion for choosing an ownership structure is the company value determined on the basis of cash flows. Cash flow formation is represented with the use of a binomial tree. There is a fixed difference, PB/r (PB>0), between the flow volume in a private company and that in a public one. The difference reflects a present value of private benefits of control. Private benefits of control include both the value of control rights and agency cost savings resulting from the separation of ownership and control. In other words, PB covers every difference between cash flows generated by a public and a private company.
If we assume that cash flow CF 0 is a cash flow in period 0, and its level does not depend on whether the company is public or private, then at any moment t and state of reality s, flow public and a private company, respectively. Since both an entrepreneur making a considerable outlay on a private company and an investor investing in a public company can also invest in risk-free assets, the following equation is satisfied:
In order to take into account incomplete portfolio diversification, which causes the entrepreneur to develop a stronger aversion to specific risk connected with the operation of his company, the model assumes that p u < q u i p d > q d . Investors with well-diversified portfolios, i.e. those investing in public companies, will value uncertain cash flows at a higher level. Hence the value of a public company is expected to be higher than that of a private company.
The values of a private company and a public one are calculated by means of the following formulas:
where:
The general function describing company value V(CF) assumes the following form:
The function (7) One can see that the graph illustrating the formation of the company value as a function of cash flow resembles a graph showing the value of a call option written for this flow 24 . Ray PB/r C reflects private company value formation. Private company value formation in bracket <PB/r; ) is based on the assumption that the minimum level of benefits to be gained by the owner of a private company corresponds with the value of private benefits of control. Ray OD illustrates public company value formation. Given flow level OA, the ownership structure is insignificant. This does not mean, however, that the ownership structure should be changed at this moment. We should take into account the possibility of such an increase or decrease in cash flow that would render the previously-taken decision unprofitable. Consequently, the possibility of deferring the decision to change ownership structure gains significance. Cash flow at level OE is so high that if the firm operates as a private company, it is no longer worth deferring the decision to change the ownership structure into that of a public company. At point E, the public company value reaches the same level as a company value whose estimation considered the flexibility to change the ownership structure (point D). Using the language of financial option analysis, such a situation means that the total option value reaches the same level as the intrinsic value of the option. The shape of curve m reflects the influence of the flexibility to change the ownership structure on the company value.
The right to choose the company ownership structure has a certain value. It seems that a good method of valuing this right is the option approach.
Estimating the value of the right to choose the company ownership structure
In our model of valuing private benefits of control, we will refer to the model put forward by Benninga, Helmantel and Sarig (BHS model). However, we calculate the company value in a different way from the BHS model. Each ownership structure is attributed a scenario concerning cash flow formation. In the case of a public company, it is scenario A; in the case of a private company -scenario B. The difference between these scenarios concerns the level and volatility ( ) of the cash flow achieved by the owner. The possibility of specific risk diversification by a public company shareholder makes the volatility of the cash flows he achieves lower than the volatility of the flows achieved by a private company owner. A higher level of the cash flow achieved by a private company shareholder reflects private benefits of control in a given period.
Using a binomial model and assuming that the decision horizon is one period, Figure 2 presents the formation of the cash flow achieved by the owner, depending on the ownership structure. Another difference between our proposal and the BHS model concerns the consideration of transaction costs connected with a change in the ownership structure. Transaction costs connected with the introduction of a company or its withdrawal from the stock exchange are treated as constants. We assume that the costs of withdrawing the company from the stock exchange are lower than the costs of a change in the opposite direction.
The description of a decision situation presented here enables us to find an analogy between this situation and the situation of an option holder. An option to change the ownership structure can thus be categorized as a switch option. The occurrence of switch costs causes the option to become a compound option 25 . This is because the current decision to change the ownership structure, or the lack of it, has an impact on the structure in which the company will operate in future periods. As a consequence, it also influences the future costs of a change in the ownership structure (the exercise price of future options) and, as a result, future decisions to change the ownership structure. In the case of options to change the ownership structure, we talk of the occurrence of nested options. It follows from the above that underlying assets are the values of companies in particular scenarios 26 . The exercise price of an option in a given node is the value of a company in an appropriate node, in an alternative scenario, minus costs of switching from a given structure to an alternative structure. [ ] 
25 N. Kulatilaka, L.Trigeorgis, The General Flexibility to Switch: Real Options Revisited, in: E.S. Schwartz, L. Trigeorgis, Real Options and Investment under Uncertainty, MIT Press, Cambridge 2001, pp.179-196. 26 By company value we mean an appropriately defined sum of the present values of income earned by the owner at each node of the tree. 27 N. Kulatilaka, L. Trigeorgis, op. cit. while hedging probabilities, q and 1-q are given as the following formulas: The process of option valuation starts at the last moment (N) the option can be exercised.
At this moment the valuation formula takes the following form:
Let us examine the case of an investor who is considering the choice of an ownership structure for an undertaking he wants to implement. Let us assume that there are only two possible scenarios which simultaneously determine the choice of the ownership structure. We make an additional assumption that the decision horizon is one period. The formation of cash flow values, according to the two scenarios, is presented in Figure 3 . company values taking into account the possibility of "switching" from one company form to the other, i.e. a change in the ownership structure, is as follows:
• for a public company:
• for a private company:
and:
V 0 (A), V 0 (B)-current value of a public and a private company, respectively, with the flexibility to change the company form from public into private and from private into public,
PV(A), PV(B)
-current values of a public and a private company, respectively, without the flexibility to change the company form,
F(A B), F(B A)
-value of flexibility to change from a public into a private company, with the assumption that the company operates as a public company, and from a private into a public company, with the assumption that the company operates as a private company, respectively.
Consequently, it is possible to establish the value of the right to change the ownership structure, with the assumption that the ownership structure chosen is optimal for the company value. The value of flexibility to change from a public to a private company, F(A B), is given as the following formula:
whereas the value of the flexibility to change from a private to a public company, F(B A), can be estimated on the basis of the formula below: control right which we have adopted, the amount of 10.5 can be treated as the value of a control right which is the flexibility to change the ownership structure from a public to a private company. The amount of 8.5 can be treated as the value of a control right which is the flexibility to change the ownership structure from a private to a public company.
Conclusions
The State Treasury's retention of shares in companies which are being privatized may result in politicians gaining private benefits of control. Politicians enjoy these benefits at the expense of the State Treasury and private investors. To protect their interests effectively, we need to identify the manifestations of private benefits of control and measure their value.
More generally, the issue of having control of a company can be reduced to the issue of having the right to choose the ownership structure. Since the decision to change the ownership structure is nor irreversible, the choice of the ownership structure is not a consequence of a simple comparison of benefits and costs. To value the right to choose the ownership structure, we can use the option valuation model. The need to take into account transaction costs connected with a change in the ownership structure causes the option to become a compound option. A convenient way of valuing this option seems to be the option-to-switch model.
As the value of private benefits of control perceived as the right to choose the ownership structure may considerably exceed the value of these benefits when estimated on the basis of the difference in expected cash flows, it may turn out that any values of the benefits estimated so far are understated.
